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THE  POTENTIAL  VALUE  OF ACCURATE and timely  information  on current 
and developing  economic  conditions  is huge.  While the value may differ 
for a legislator,  a corporate  president,  the chairman  of the Federal  Reserve 
Board,  "a  Treasury  Department  revenue  estimator,  or an econometric  fore- 
caster,  -such information  carries  extremely  high value-both  private  and 
social. Official  acceptance  of this fact dates back at least to 1957, when 
Raymond  J. Saulnier,  then chairman  of the Council of Economic  Ad- 
visers,  made  a solicitation  to the Bureau  of the Census  that resulted  in the 
publication in 1961 of the monthly Business Cycle Developments.'  As first 
published,  BCD  took maximum  advantage  of the  long years  of painstaking 
research  by Wesley  Mitchell,  Arthur  F. Burns,  Geoffrey  H. Moore,  Julius 
Shiskin,  and  others-many of them  associated  with  the  National  Bureau  of 
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several  members  of the Brookings  panel for their valuable  aid at various stages of the 
research.  The author  is especially  grateful  to Jesse Hall, who provided  substantial  help 
throughout  all aspects of the project  and who was, in short, the model of a dedicated 
research  assistant. 
1. The background  of this event and the technical  rationale  underlying  the data pub- 
lished in BCD are discussed  in Julius Shiskin, Signals of Recession  and Recovery:  An 
Experiment  withi  Monthly  Reporting,  Occasional  Paper  77 (National  Bureau  of Economic 
Research, 1961). In November 1968 the document was renamed  Business Conditions 
Digest, but retained  its BCD initials. 
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Economic  Research-who favored  the so-called  "cyclical  indicators  ap- 
proach"  to the analysis  of business  conditions.  The major  feature  of the 
early  volumes  of BCD was  the  regular  publication  of some  eighty  economic 
series  that had been judged to be important  measures  or indicators  of 
national  economic  conditions.  More than fifty of these series  had been 
classified  into "leading,"  "roughly  coincident,"  or "lagging"  groups,  ac- 
cording  to their  typical  timing  and  conformity  with  respect  to U.S. business 
cycles.2 
During  the past half dozen years,  the cyclical  indicators  data have lost 
their  monopoly  position  in BCD, which  has  come  to include  a vast  array  of 
income  and  product  account  data,  anticipations  and  intentions  data,  diffu- 
sion indexes,  and other  measures.  This shift reflects  the fact that serious 
students  of economic  conditions  use a variety  of analytical  approaches  to 
the subject,  including  the econometric  model, and that a more inclusive 
data  base  would  consequently  be better  able  "to  provide  statistical  informa- 
tion so arranged  as to facilitate  the analysis  of the course  of the Nation's 
economy"  for a broader  group  of users.3  At the same  time, the National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research  (NBER)  itself  has  recently  come  to the view 
that the analysis  and forecasting  of economic  conditions  can profitably  be 
undertaken  in a variety  of formats,  with  varying  emphases  and advantages. 
Under  NBER auspices,  Victor  Zarnowitz,  Jacob Mincer,  Rosanne  Cole, 
and others  have done seminal  work on the evaluation  of forecasting  ac- 
curacy  and the usefulness  of various  kinds  of forecasting  techniques  based 
on autoregressive  time series analysis  as well as standard  macroecono- 
metric  models.4  Although  these  developments  have  to be read  as a relative 
diminution  of interest  in the cyclical  indicators  approach,  no evidence  sug- 
gests that the indicators  are about to disappear.  Indeed,  the 1960 list of 
indicators  that  formed  the original  basis  for BCD was  extensively  restudied 
under  the direction  of Moore  and Shiskin,  and a revised  and expanded  list 
2. See Shiskin,  Signals  of Recession,  pp. 15-17. 
3. See the statement  to this effect on the inside front cover of any recent issue of 
BCD. 
4. See, for example,  Victor Zarnowitz,  An Appraisal  of Short-Term  Economic  Fore- 
casts, Occasional Paper 104 (Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1967); and Jacob Mincer (ed.), Economic  Forecasts  and Expecta- 
tions: Analyses  of Forecasting  Behavior  and  Performance,  Studies  in Business  Cycles 19 
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-the  1966  list-was published  in 1967.5  Shiskin  and others  have  continued 
their  efforts  to improve  the currency  and predictive  content  of the indica- 
tors and, to this end, have developed  and refined  a number  of techniques 
for removing  the so-called  "noise  component"  from a time series. 
In recent  years,  judging  by speeches  and press  releases,  government  offi- 
cials  have  become  increasingly  convinced  of the predictive  reliability  of the 
indicators.  Probably  at least some individuals  with responsibility  for sta- 
bilization  policy  treat  the leading  indicators  as a major  input  to their  own 
recommendations.  The media  have obviously  sensed  this growing  interest 
and have  themselves  latched  on to the cyclical  indicators.  The "short  list" 
of leading  indicators,  released  monthly,  is now accorded  publicity  perhaps 
greater  than its significance  warrants,  and surely  beyond  the consuming 
public's  ability  to place  it in proper  perspective.6 
The  very  facts  of official  publication  and growing  interest  by government 
and  the press  impart  credibility  and  respectability  to the  cyclical  indicators. 
But  what  of the  cold, objective  evidence?  Does it point  to the  indicators  as a 
reliable  foundation  for important  public  and private  decisions?  There  are 
two distinct  bodies of literature  on which  to base a scientific  conclusion 
about  the value  of the indicators.  The  first  is a large  and growing  literature, 
produced  by the proponents  of the indicators  themselves,  which  represents 
a continual  effort  to monitor  their  performance.7  These  studies  accept  the 
validity  of the indicator  approach  to forecasting  and concentrate  on in- 
terpreting  recent  movements  in the indicators,  improving  measurement, 
and  updating  the  indicator  lists.  An entirely  separate  body  of evidence  con- 
sists  of studies  by disinterested  parties.  Many,  but not all, of these  express 
frank  skepticism  about  the indicator  approach  and succeed  in turning  up 
5. Geoffrey H.  Moore and Julius Shiskin, Indicators  of Business  Expansions  and 
Contractions,  Occasional  Paper 103 (National Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1967). 
6. This situation is in no way unique to the leading indicators.  It occurs when the 
preliminary  GNP accounts  are published  quarterly;  in the November-December  period 
when many econometric  model forecasts  of the coming year  come out in rapid-fire  suc- 
cession; when the quarterly  reports on consumer  sentiment  are issued by the Survey 
Research  Center  of the University  of Michigan;  and so on. 
7. The most recent additions in this area are two papers by Geoffrey H. Moore: 
"New Work on Business  Cycles," prepared  for the 53rd Annual  Report  (1973) of the 
National Bureau  of Economic  Research  (forthcoming);  and "Economic  Indicator  Anal- 
ysis During 1969-72," to appear  in Nations and Households  in Economic  Growth:  Es- 
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rather  damaging  evidence.  Unfortunately,  most of the best of these  studies 
are more than a decade  old. Indeed,  I know of only one new study  that 
belongs  in this group and that has evaluated  any of the recent data in 
depth.8 
I submit,  then,  that  the  degree  of interest  in the  indicators  has  outstripped 
the production  of objective,  "outside,"  evidence  bearing  on their  scientific 
merit.  Such  a situation  seems  to me to call for a new appraisal.  A general 
reappraisal  constitutes  a research  project  worthy  of at least one large  vol- 
ume and clearly  well beyond  the scope of a single  paper.  I have  therefore 
been  forced  to define  a narrower  study  which  could  lay some  claim  to hav- 
ing been conducted  in depth  without  severely  stretching  the bounds  of a 
single,  readable  paper.  In such  a situation  priorities  become  extremely  im- 
portant,  and  I believe  that  an evaluation  of the  construction  and  forecasting 
content  of the "composite  index  of leading  indicators"  represents  the first 
order of business.  Even within this narrow  focus, some may be disap- 
pointed  by an absence  of comparisons  between  the forecasting  accuracy 
of the leading  indicators  and existing  macroeconometric  models, and by 
the relative  emphasis  that I place on qualitative,  rather  than quantitative, 
forecasting  accuracy.9 
8.  This study  is H. 0.  Stekler  and Martin  Schepsman,  "Forecasting  with an Index  of 
Leading Series,"  Journal  of the American  Statistical Association,  Vol. 68 (June 1973), 
pp. 291-96. I was unaware  of their paper until after I had written  the original  draft of 
this paper and have since read their work with great interest.  Their principal  finding 
anticipates  one of the results  of my section on turning  point tests, but beyond that the 
two papers  are quite  distinct.  My own work  shows  the influence  of the 1962  analysis  done 
by M. Hatanaka,  "Application  of Cross-Spectral  Analysis  and Complex  Demodulation: 
Business  Cycle Indicators,"  which appears  as Chapter  12 in C. W. J. Granger,  in asso- 
ciation with M. Hatanaka,  Spectral  Analysis  of Econzomic  Time  Series (Princeton  Uni- 
versity  Press, 1964).  Well-known  earlier  studies  were done by Arthur  M. Okun, "On the 
Appraisal of Cyclical Turning-Point  Predictors,"  Journal  of Business,  Vol. 33 (April 
1960), pp. 101-20; and Sidney S. Alexander,  "Rate of Change Approaches  to Fore- 
casting-Diffusion  Indexes  and First Differences,"  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 68 (June 1958), 
pp. 288-301. A useful  reference  for the literature  in the area is D. J. Daly, "Forecasting 
with Statistical  Indicators,"  in Bert G. Hickman  (ed.), Econometric  Models of Cyclical 
Behavior,  Studies  in Income  and Wealth  36 (Columbia  University  Press  for the National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research, 1972), Vol. 2. 
9. With regard  to a comparison  with macroeconometric  models, the major  problem 
is that there is not yet a sufficient  history of quarterly  econometric  forecasts  by a suffi- 
cient number  of models to render  such a comparison  especially  useful. On the matter 
of qualitative  vs. quantitative  forecasting  accuracy,  my choice reflects  a personal  belief 
that forecasting  of directions  of change or of turning  points should be regarded  as the 
avowed  purpose  of the indicators,  and that success  in that sphere  alone would constitute 
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The  next  section  of the paper  identifies  the twelve  variables  that  form  the 
composite  index  of leading  indicators  (hereafter  CLI)  and  presents  my view 
of the rationale  for constructing  the CLI. The following  section  contains 
the results  of a number  of turning  point tests conducted  on the CLI, and 
the next applies  the technique  of spectral  analysis  to evaluate  the manner 
of construction  of the CLI  and  to shed  additional  light  on the results  of the 
turning  point tests. There  follows an indication  of how spectral  analysis 
might  be used  to form  a new  leading  indicator  that  overcomes  some  of the 
difficulties  revealed  in the current  CLI,  and two variants  of such  an indica- 
tor are  then evaluated.  Conclusions  and suggestions  for further  work are 
contained  in the final  section. 
The  Composite  Leading  Indicator  and  Its Components 
The current  CLI is constructed  in three basic steps which produce  a 
single  monthly  index  from  the 1966  short  list of twelve  leading  indicators.10 
The  twelve  components  are  listed  with  abbreviated  titles  in Table  1, and  are 
thereafter  referred  to in the  text  and  subsequent  tables  by even  briefer  titles. 
Column  2 in the  table  records  the  median  lead  of each  series  with  respect  to 
the turning  points  in the NBER reference  cycles  from the year shown  in 
column  1 through  1965, the terminal  point for construction  of the 1966 
short  list. Column  4 updates  column  2 with the median  lead at reference 
turns  in the 1948-70  period;  and  columns  5 and  6 display  the  range  of leads 
and  lags  at peaks  and troughs  separately  for the more  recent  period.  Col- 
umn  4 displays  substantially  more uniformity  in the median  lead than is 
shown  in column  2. Columns  5 and 6, however,  reveal  that the timing  of 
each  leading  indicator  displays  a very  wide  range  of variation  at reference 
turns.  This  matter  will receive  attention  in subsequent  discussions;  suffice 
it to say here  that this variability  causes  obvious  difficulties  in using the 
specific  indicator  variables  or the CLI  itself  to predict  turning  points. 
The  first  step  in constructing  the CLI  is to standardize  the monthly  data 
so that  each  series  displays  the same average  absolute  monthly  change.11 
This  makes  it possible  to combine  series  with  inherently  different  units of 
measurement.  The  next  step  is to combine  the  adjusted  series  into  a weighted 
10. One  short  list variable,  corporate  profits  after taxes,  is actually  a quarterly  series. 
The details  of its incorporation  into the monthly  CLI need not concern  us here. 
11. I shall  attempt  only to provide  the flavor  of the main  points  in the construction  of 
the CLI.  A fuller  description  can be found  in Moore and Shiskin,  Intdicators. +  In 1%  In ON 
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average  using the index scores  shown  in column  3 of Table 1. Thus, the 
index  of common  stock  prices  receives  the largest  weight  in the CLI,  while 
the change in installment  debt receives  the smallest. These scores, or 
weights,  represent  the average  score  received  by each series  on six criteria, 
each  of which  has a potential  score  from  zero  through  100.  The six criteria 
test such  things  as the "economic  significance"  of the series,  its "confor- 
mity"  and "timing"  with  respect  to the reference  cycle,  how quickly  it be- 
comes  available  (its "currency"),  and so on. The resulting  average  is then 
subjected  to a "reverse  trend adjustment"  to ensure  that the index has 
precisely  the same trend as the composite  index of coincident  indicators 
(hereafter,  CCI).12  The CCI, like the gross  national  product  or industrial 
production,  has a pronounced  upward  trend.  A number  of the series  in 
Table 1 relate  more  to output  changes  than  to output  levels  and have  little 
if any trend.  The first two steps in the process  of constructing  the CLI 
therefore  produce  a series  that displays  many  small  declines  not indicative 
of a coming  drop  in the CCI.  The reverse  trend  adjustment  is intended  to 
overcome  this difficulty. 
At this point an obvious  question  suggests  itself: Having  identified  the 
series  to be combined  into the CLI, why not run a regression  and let the 
data  themselves  decide  on the  weights  to be applied?13  To do this,  of course, 
requires  the designation  of a dependent  variable  to be regressed  on the in- 
dependent  variables  contained  in Table 1. Since  the purpose  of the leading 
indicators  is to anticipate  the movements  in general  business  conditions, 
either  the CCI  itself  or its price-deflated  version  are  obvious  candidates  for 
the dependent  variable.'4  The  results  of a multiple  regression  explaining  the 
12. See Julius  Shiskin,  "Reverse  Trend  Adjustment  of Leading  Indicators,"  Review  of 
Economics  and Statistics,  Vol. 49 (February  1967),  pp. 45-49. 
13. In fact, John E. Maher posed precisely  this question and then used regression 
analysis  to construct  an index  in "Forecasting  Industrial  Production,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  Vol. 65 (April 1957),  pp. 158-65. 
14. Solomon Fabricant  has recently  argued  that cyclical  reversals  in the direction  of 
economic  activity  ought  to be defined  in terms  of "real"  or price-deflated  variables  rather 
than  a mixture  of data  in constant  and current  prices,  as has been  the tradition.  My basic 
agreement  with this position has led me to use the deflated  CCI as the standard  to be 
predicted  or explained  throughout  this study. I have, however,  made no attempt  to de- 
flate  the components  of the CLI. I am not certain,  in many  cases, what  deflator  ought to 
be used, nor am I certain  that the argument  that applies  to the variables  that define  the 
cyclical turns necessarily  applies to all variables  that are to be considered  indicators  of 
the cyclical turns. See Solomon Fabricant,  "The 'Recession' of 1969-1970,"  in Victor 
Zarnowitz  (ed.), The  Business  Cycle  Today  (Columbia  University  Press  for the National 
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Table 2. Regression  of the Deflated  Composite  Coincident  Indicator  on 
the Short  List of Leading  Indicatorsa 
Regression 
Variable  and median  lead (months)  coefficient  t-statistic 
Workweek  (-5)  -1.479  -3.49 
Unemployment  claims (-6)  2.864  8.20 
Durable orders  (-4)  1.461  10.56 
Plant and equipment  contracts  (-6)  0.902  2.10 
Business  formation  (-7)  -0.001  -0.04 
Profits  (-2)  0.294  5.24 
Price-cost  ratio (-3)  -0.199  -1  . go 
Stock prices  (-4)  -0.027  -0.98 
Materials  prices  (-2)  -0.043  -2.53 
Building  permits  (-6)  -0.019  -2.41 
Inventory  change (-8)  -0.129  -4.89 
Installment  debt (-10)  -0.026  -0.46 
2=  0.991  Standard  error  of estimate =  2.59 
Source: Derived by author from Table 1. 
a.  The regression included an intercept and a quadratic trend and was fitted to monthly data over the 
period from 1948:1 through 1972:2. 
deflated  CCI by the variables  in Table 1, each lagged  by the number  of 
months  shown  in column  2 of Table 1, is reported  in Table  2.15  One may 
compare  these  results  with  a regression  of the deflated  CCI  on the CLI,  the 
latter  lagged  five  months  to correspond  to its median  lead  at turning  points. 
The resulting  equation  is 
CCI =  8.140 +  0.052 Time -  0.004 (Time)2 
(4.50)  (5.95)  (-7.26) 
(1)  +  0.986 CLI-5. 
(19.31) 
=  0.984; standard  error  of estimate = 2.85. 
The numbers  in parentheses  here and in subsequent  equations  are t-sta- 
tistics.  It is clear  that  the relative  weights  that translate  the short  list varia- 
bles into the CLI do not correspond  to those chosen  by a multiple  regres- 
sion of the CCI on the entire  set of variables.  In fact, according  to the 
results  in Table  2, three  of the identified  leading  indicators  appear  to make 
15. The results  are qualitatively  similar  whether  the CCI, the deflated  CCI, or com- 
ponents of the CCI, such as industrial  production  or manufacturing  and trade sales, is 
the dependent  variable.  The same  is also true  of minor  variations  in the lag pattern  of the 
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no significant  marginal  contribution  to the explanation  of the CCI, and 
of the nine significant  indicators,  fully five appear  with negative  signs in 
the multiple  regression  equation!16 
These  findings  point  up the conceptual  differences  between  the CLI  type 
construction  and  the predicted-value  index  yielded  by a multiple  regression 
equation.  From  the point  of view  of the latter,  a prediction  error  of a given 
size carries  the same  weight  no matter  at what  sample  point it occurs.  The 
regression  of the CCI on the leading  indicators  does not represent  a be- 
havioral  or technological  relation;  it is merely  an exercise  in curve  fitting 
or-at  best-some  kind of  pseudo reduced-form  equation. The least 
squares  procedure  will assign  whatever  weights  (coefficients)  are required 
to fit the CCI  with  minimum  residual  variance  over  the observed  sample  of 
points.  A poor  fit at the  turning  points  can  be overwhelmed  by a sufficiently 
close fit at the vast majority  of data  points  between  the turns  in economic 
activity.  If there  were  no essential  distinctions  between  the empirical  rela- 
tions among  the variables  in turning  point zones and in periods  of fairly 
smooth  unidirectional  change,  one would  expect  a multiple  regression  ap- 
proach  to be optimal.  But  the  very  point  that  has  been  argued  most  strongly 
by the  proponents  of the  indicator  approach-going all the  way  back  to the 
early  work  of Mitchell-is that  there  is something  special  about  the  turning 
point  zones.  The  CLI  is alleged  to be constructed  so as to maximize  the use 
of the turning  point  information  contained  in the various  leading  indicator 
series.'7  The CLI construction  must be interpreted  along the following 
lines: 
1. A turn  in overall  business  activity  is generally  preceded  by a turning 
point in many of a group  of series  that can be identified.'8 
16. A  similar sign phenomenon was found by Maher in "Forecasting  Industrial 
Production." 
17. Whether  the CLI-as  constructed-does indeed  extract  the maximum  amount of 
turning  point information  from its component series is a matter  that will be taken up 
below, but that is clearly  the intent. 
18. This statement  does not  imply  direct  causality  (if it did, one would  attempt  to esti- 
mate a behavioral  or technological  relation that could be expected  to hold outside the 
sample,  that would have directly  interpretable  coefficients,  and so on). Rather,  it implies 
something  about the process  through  which those forces that d(, lead to turning  points 
operate  within the structure  of the U.S. economy. Thus a dow  /nturn that might result 
from a tightening  of monetary  policy would inevitably  have an impact  on some or all of 
the variables  durable orders, plant and equipment  contracts, profits, price-cost  ratio, 
stock prices,  building  permits,  and installment  debt before  it affected  the aggregate  level 
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2. Many of the leading  series  will therefore  signal  any impending  turn 
in overall  activity. 
3. Which  of the series  signals  earliest  and most strongly  depends,  how- 
ever,  on the real  cause  of the impending  turn  and  the exact  process  through 
which  it operates  to induce  the turn. 
4. It is therefore  necessary  to provide  a mechanism  that gathers  many 
potentially  duplicative  signals of the same impending  event-that  is, to 
provide  for  the  many  possible  causes  of a turning  point,  to judge  the  quanti- 
tative importance  of events by "counting  up" the number  of potential 
indicators  giving  the same  signal,  and thereby  to reduce  the likelihood  of 
the index  being  overly  affected  by a false  signal. 
5. This  implies  not the fitting  of a regression  plane,  but the averaging  of 
a broadly  based  group  of conforming  series  with  positive  weights  somehow 
representative  of their individual  reliability  in signaling  turning  points.'9 
While  I am not entirely  certain  that the proponents  of the CLI would 
subscribe  to every  detail  of the preceding  paragraph  and its five summary 
points,  I do believe  that  it represents  a fair  inference  of their  view and  that 
it is a defensible  position.20 
Turning  Point  Tests  of the CLI 
The CLI  exists  primarily  to signal  the direction  of change  of overall  eco- 
nomic  activity,  and its success  must  be judged  largely  in that context.  Un- 
fortunately,  there  exists  no "User's  Guide to the CLI" and therefore  no 
prescribed  methodology  by which  the message  of the indicator  is supposed 
to be read.  The officially  published  leads and lags of the CLI at specific 
reference  turns  are all established  after  the fact, by hindsight,  on the basis 
of the most recent  data. Table 3 contains  the record  of the CLI, on this 
19. This is a rather  unusual  "model"  in which combining  a number  of simple  regres- 
sions may indeed be preferable  to running  a multiple  regression.  A weighted multiple 
regression-that is, one that weighted  the turns more heavily  than the rest of the data 
points-might  accomplish  the same thing. But considerable  artistry  would be required 
to devise an appropriate  set of weights. 
20. Again, I mean this to be interpreted  as defensible  in concept; I am not implying 
that the CLI  cannot  be improved  upon, even  in the context stated  above. It might  also be 
remarked  here that the CLI did prove to be generally  superior  to the predicted  values 
from the equation  in Table 2 in the kind of turning  point tests to be reported  on in the 
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Table  3. Official  Leads  and  Lags of the Composite  Leading  Indicator  at 
Cyclical  Turning  Points,  1948-70 
Lead(-)  Lead(-) 
or lag(+)  or lag(+) 
Peak  (months)  Trough  (months) 
November  1948  -5  October 1949  -5 
July 1953  -6  August 1954  -9 
July 1957  -8  April 1958  -2 
May 1960  -4  February  1961  -2 
November 1969  -2  November 1970  -1 
Source: Business Conditions  Digest (March 1973), Table F, p. 115. 
ex post basis, for each of the officially  recognized turning points since 1948. 
The record appears  to be quite good at first glance, but a careful look at the 
CLI time series itself reveals several problems. Consider, for example, the 
following string of consecutive monthly changes in the CLI from July 1956 
through August 1957: 
Change 
in the 
Year  and  month  CLI 
1956  July  -0.4 
August  +1.1 
September  -0.2 
October  +0.3 
November  +0.7  <  CLI official  peak month 
December  -0.  1 
1957  January  -0.3 
February  +0.  1 
March  +0.1 
April  -0.6 
May  +0.3 
June  +0.2 
July  -0.1  <--Reference peak month 
August  +0.2 
Is it really so obvious that the CLI reached its peak in November 1956 and 
not, say, March 1957 or June 1957? Once it is known that the reference  peak 
occurred  in July 1957, it becomes much easier to interpret  the CLI as hav- 
ing been on a "downward wriggle" from November  1956 on,  but until 
hindsight was available, such an interpretation would have been far more 
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The  point  is that  a test of the CLI  must  be based  on a specific  set of rules 
devised  to determine,  ex ante, the meaning  of the signal  being given.  The 
rules must (a) provide  a way to filter  out false signals;  (b) not filter  so 
thoroughly  as to reduce  measurably  the lead time of genuine  signals;  and 
(c) be simple  enough to be operational.  After some thought  and experi- 
mentation,  I have settled  on the following  set of rules: 
1. Forecasts  are  made  one month  at a time,  the possible  forecasts  being 
no change  in the cyclical  phase  (NC), a peak is coming  (P), or a trough  is 
coming  (T). 
2. The signal  obtained  as of month  t determines  the forecast  (either  NC, 
P, or T) for month t +  1. 
3. During  an upswing  phase,  two consecutive  declines  in the CLI  lead  to 
the prediction  P for the month  following  that  in which  the second  consecu- 
tive decline  occurs. 
4. Once  two consecutive  declines  of the CLI have been observed  in an 
upswing  phase,  two consecutive  increases  in the CLI  are  required  to define 
a false  peak  signal  and change  the prediction  from  P to NC.21 
5. The  rules  during  a downswing  phase  are  precisely  symmetric,  with  two 
consecutive  increases  in the CLI  being  required  for a T prediction;  and  fol- 
lowing a T prediction,  two consecutive  declines  are required  to define  a 
false  trough  and change  the prediction  from  T to NC. 
Notice the requirement  in the rules  that  the forecaster  know  whether  the 
economy  is currently  in an upswing  or downswing  phase.  For the purpose 
of the tests to be conducted,  I shall assume  that the NBER identifies  and 
announces  turning  points with perfect  accuracy  and minimum  possible 
delay.  This means,  for example,  that if a peak  is to be dated  as having  oc- 
curred  at month t, the NBER proclaims  the peak in month t + 2, just 
before  the forecaster  has to interpret  the CLI  signal  of month  t +  2.22 
What  remains  now is to specify  a set of requirements  by which  the per- 
formance  of the CLI may be judged.  I have settled  on the following: 
1. If a peak  occurs  in month  t, the correct  and required  predictions  for 
months t -  3, t -  2, t -  1,  t, t +  1, and t +  2 are all P. That is, a three- 
21. This means  that two consecutive  declines  in the CLI will always  be followed  by at 
least two months of peak predictions. 
22. For example,  the NBER observes  the CCI for month t in month t +  1 and finds 
that it increased.  In month t +  2, it observes  the CCI for month t +  1 and finds that it 
declined.  Month t is immediately  proclaimed  to have been the peak month  and the fore- 
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month lead at the peak is required  and, in view of the assumption  made 
about  identifying  a peak,  predictions  of P must  also  be required  for  the two 
months  following  the peak. 
2. Since  it makes  little sense  to penalize  a lead that  is longer  than three 
months, a P prediction  is also considered  to be correct  as early  as nine 
months  prior  to the peak month  provided  that it is part of a consecutive 
string  of P predictions  continuing  at least through  the peak  month.23 
3. The  trough  rules  are  similar  except  that  the  requiredlead  is two  months 
rather  than three,  and the maximum  permissible  lead is six months  rather 
than nine. Because  the official  downswing  phases  since 1948  have all been 
about  a year  in length,  it seems  unreasonable  to regard  a lead longer  than 
six months  as informative. 
4. For all months  not covered  under  rules  (1)-(3), the correct  prediction 
is NC. 
Before  applying  these procedures  to test the CLI, a few more ad hoc 
decisions  require  explanation.  The mini-recession  of 1967  is not officially 
recognized,  but it did contain  a quarter  in which  real GNP fell and it is 
picked  up by the CLI.  I shall  therefore  count  the  mini-recession  in the  turn- 
ing point tests, and for this purpose  I have dated the peak and trough 
months  as December  1966  and March  1967,  respectively.24  The 1959  steel 
strike  and the 1970 auto strike  show up very clearly  as strong negative 
changes  in the CLI.  The former  would  lead to a false  peak  prediction;  the 
latter  would  reverse  the appropriate  recognition  of the 1970  trough.  I have 
simply  not permitted  these  false predictions  to take place,  on the grounds 
that anyone  using  the CLI  at the time  would  (or at least  should)  have  been 
able to discount  these  events. 
Table  4 contains  the record  of the CLI at the turning  points  during  the 
23. Thus,  no credit  is given for an isolated (perhaps  random)  P prediction  six months 
before  the peak; to be counted  as correct  it must  be followed  consecutively  by at least six 
more P predictions.  If the peak month is month t, the following string  of predictions  is 
considered  to have provided  a one-month  lead at the peak: 
Month  t-7  t-6  t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-I  t 
Prediction  NC  P  P  NC  NC  NC  P  P 
The earlier  P predictions  followed by the NC predictions  are regarded  as having been 
contradictory  and misleading. 
24. My dating of the turns  is based loosely on the monthly  behavior  of the CCI and 
its components,  and other  evidence  such  as the Business  Week  index.  In view  of the short- 
ness of the downswing  phase in this case, I could require  of the CLI nothing stronger 
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Table  4. Unofficial  Leads  and  Lags of the Composite  Leading  Indicator  at 
Cyclical  Turning  Points,  1948-70 
Lead (-)  Lead(-) 
or lag (+)  or lag(+) 
Peak  (months)  Trough  (months) 
November 1948  -8  October 1949  -2 
July 1953  -3  August 1954  -6 
July 1957  missed  April 1958  +1 
May 1960  -1  February  1961  +1 
December  1966  -6  March 1967  +2 
November 1969  +1  November 1970  -3 
Source: Calculations by author. 
1948-70 period  based on the rules and requirements  specified  above. A 
comparison  of Tables  3 and  4 reveals  some  noticeable  differences.  The offi- 
cial  data  record  an ex post eight-month  lead  at the 1957  peak;  by my nearly 
ex ante scoring  the CLI misses  the 1957  peak  entirely.  For the 1948  peak 
and the 1970  trough,  I score  leads two and three  months  longer  than the 
official  leads.  For the other  seven  turns  that  can be compared,  my leads  all 
fall about  three  months  short  of the official  leads.  The  mini-peak  of 1966  is 
so clearly  defined  in the CLI series  that there  can be no doubt that the 
NBER-had  it defined  a December  peak-would have recorded  a six- to 
seven-month  lead for the CLI. A general  conclusion  that emerges,  there- 
fore, is a distinct tendency  for  the hindsight leads to exceed the foresight 
leads.  The  record  as established  in Table  4 is not bad, but it is significantly 
inferior  to the impression  given  by Table  3. 
Neither  Table  3 nor  Table  4, however,  provides  any  information  about  a 
possible  tendency  of the CLI to provide  false signals.25  Table 5 charac- 
terizes  the entire  set of monthly  forecasts  for the period  1948-71  in a two- 
way table that compares  the predicted  and realized  results.  First, it is 
immediately  obvious  that  the predictions  and  realizations  can  by no stretch 
of the imagination  be considered  independent  or unrelated  to each other. 
Fully 82 percent  of the observations  lie on the main diagonal  of the two- 
way  table  of predicted  and  realized  results;  only  50 out of 285  observations, 
less than 18 percent,  represent  errors  of one kind or another.  But clearly, 
independence  is not a very interesting  hypothesis  to be testing. Of 285 
25. Many earlier  studies  have been critical  of the indicator  approach  on the grounds 
of an excessive  tendency  to signal  false turns.  The classic study  that reaches  this conclu- 
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Table 5.  Turning  Point Test of the Composite  Leading Indicator, 1948-71a 
Realized  result 
Percent  of 
Total  predicted 
No  observa-  turns  that 
Predicted  result  change  Peak  Trough  tions  are  falseb 
No change (NC)  181  14  8  203  ... 
Peak (P)  28  29  0  57  49.1 
Trough  (T)  0  0  25  25  0 
Total observations  209  43  33  285  ... 
Percent of realized turns 
that are missede  ...  32.6  24.2  ... 
Source: Calculations by author. 
a.  To test independence: obs. x2 = 276.2; X24;  0.01  =  13.3, where obs. x2 is the chi-square value for the 
observed data computed under the assumption that predictions and  realizations are independent, and 
X24; 0.01  is the value that an observed chi-square with 4 degrees of freedom would exceed with probability 
0.01 if predictions and realizations were independent. 
b. A P (T) prediction is false if it occurs for a month other than the peak (trough) month, the three (two) 
months prior to the peak (trough) month, or the two months following the peak (trough) month, or if it 
occurs outside of a consecutive string of P (T) predictions from the peak (trough) month back to at most 
nine (six) months before the peak (trough) month. 
c.  A realized peak (trough) has been missed if the peak (trough) was not predicted  for the peak (trough) 
month, the three (two) months prior to the peak (trough) month, or the two months following the peak 
(trough) month. 
months,  only 64 require  a prediction  other  than  no change  (NC).26  Thus  a 
"naive"  forecaster  who never  said anything  but NC would have made 64 
errors,  an error  rate  of 22 percent,  compared  with 50 errors,  an error  rate 
of 18  percent,  resulting  from  use of the CLI.  The  additional  statistics  shown 
in the last  column  and  last line of Table  5 offer  a useful  way of viewing  the 
50 errors  committed  by the CLI. Nearly  one-fourth  (24.2 percent)  of the 
months  that should  have  carried  a trough  prediction  received  an erroneous 
NC prediction;  nearly  one-third  of the months  that should  have  carried  a 
peak prediction  received  an erroneous  NC prediction.  But these are not 
the most serious  errors;  they point primarily  to the fact  that the turns  are 
predicted  with shorter  leads (and somewhat  less consistency)  than one 
might  like. The really  serious  error  involves  the false  peak  predictions.  Of 
all the P predictions,  nearly  half (49.1 percent)  were  false. When  the CLI 
signals  a peak,  flip  a coin!  And  that  is a serious  indictment  of the  indicator.27 
26. 6 Ps for each of the six peaks, 3 Ts for the 1967  trough,  and 5 Ts for each of the 
other five troughs. 
27. In Signals  of Recession  (pp. 108-14),  Shiskin  discusses  the problem  of false  signals 
over the 1948-61 period. He attributes  the false peak signals that he (and I) observe  in 
1951 to the pattern  of the defense  build-up  due to the Korean War, finds  it difficult  to 
explain  those of 1956,  and rationalizes  those  in mid-1959  as due to the steel strike.  I have 
already  dealt  with the latter  by disregarding  the mid-1959  signals,  but I am not convinced 
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But perhaps  this  conclusion  is overly  negative.  By my test a "false"  peak 
signal  is one that is not followed  directly  by an economic  recession  of the 
classical  sort.  Some-Ilse Mintz  especially-have argued  that  one ought  to 
expand  the notion of a recession  to include  a period  of substantial  decline 
in the rate of growth  of the economy.28  If this notion is accepted,  a peak 
signal  is not to be considered  false  if it is followed  by a significant  sustained 
slowdown  in economic  activity.  While I continue  to believe  that a valid 
distinction  can be drawn  between  a slowdown  and a classical  recession,  I 
do not deny that my conclusion  regarding  false peaks  would have to be 
softened  considerably  if the peak  signals  in question  turned  out to be reli- 
able predictors  of significant  slowdowns  in economic  growth.  Table  6 con- 
tains  a chronology  of the rate  of economic  growth  immediately  before  and 
after  the dates  at which  my test of the CLI  records  false  peak  signals.  I have 
measured  the growth  rate by using the deflated  CCI, but an alternative 
calculation  based  on the index  of industrial  production  yields  the same  sort 
of results.  Combining  the evidence  in Table  6 with  the results  of the earlier 
analysis  of the CLI, I conclude  that the April 1951 signal  can easily be 
rescued  from  the false-signal  designation.  The  November  1950  signal  could 
have  been  regarded  as useful  if it had been  maintained,  but it was reversed 
for three  months  beginning  in January  1951.  Similarly,  the February  1957 
signal  would  have  constituted  a reasonable  lead  for the July  1957  peak,  but 
it was reversed  in April 1957.  The signal  in December  1959  was followed 
immediately  by an up-tick  in an already  meager  growth  rate  and the signal 
was  reversed  three  months  before  the May 1960  peak,  just  as the  level  of the 
CCI was already  heading  downward.  The other  signals  shown  in Table  6 
were  soon followed  by increases  in the growth  rate  or by declines  that  were 
reversed  before  reaching  significant  proportions.  Thus  I conclude  that  seven 
of the eight  signals  shown  in Table  6 must  be regarded  as false;  the concept 
of a growth  recession  is not sufficient  to rescue  the CLI  from  the charge  of 
excessive  signaling  of false  peaks.  Mintz's  conclusion  is quite  the opposite 
of mine,  and  I submit  that our  differences  result  from  the fact  that  her  con- 
clusion  rests  on an ex post interpretation  of the CLI  while  mine  continues 
to be based  on an ex ante  reading  of the data.  What  Mintz's  chronology  can 
ignore as meaningless  wriggles  I read as confusing  data that negate the 
value  of the preceding  signal.29 
28. See Ilse Mintz, "Dating American  Growth Cycles,"  in Business  Cycle Today. 
29. Lest anyone think that the CLI fails entirely  to filter  out false signals,  let me cite 
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Table 6.  Economic Growth  Rates around  Dates of False Peak Signals 
of the Composite  Leading Indicator, 1948-71 
Annual  rate of growth  of thze  CCI (percent)" 
6 months  First 3  Second  3 
Date of false  prior to  months  follow-  months  follow- 
peak signal  peak signal  ing signal  ing signal 
November 1950  +21.7  +19.5  +8.0 
April 1951  +12.5  -1.9  +1.0 
May 1952  +7.7  +6.5  +27.6 
March 1956  +6.3  +2.3  +7.6 
June 1956  +2.3  +7.6  +6.0 
February  1957  +7.9  -4.2  +2.2 
December  1959  +1.4  +3.4  -1.3 
July 1962  +8.7  +3.7  +4.3 
Source: Calculations by author. 
a.  CCI = composite coincident indicator (the reverse trend adjusted CLI). 
Up to this point, I have been charitable  to the CLI by conducting ex ante 
turning point tests on historically revised data. In point of fact, what the 
forecaster  has available  to him in month t and what the newspapers  print is a 
highly preliminary  estimate of the CLI for month t -  1  and a first-revision 
estimate of the CLI for month t -  2. Indeed, the preliminary estimate is 
generally  based on some six to eight components, rather  than the full twelve. 
A true ex ante test of the CLI must be based on the preliminary  and first- 
revision data, not the historically revised data. Obviously, it is not possible 
to obtain the preliminary  and first-revision  data for the 1966 short list CLI 
for a long enough period to run a useful test. I have, however, been able to 
gather such data for all the components back to 1961 and for many of them 
back to  1956. With these I was able to construct a pseudo-series of pre- 
liminary and first-revision CLI estimates.30  My preliminary estimates are 
regarded  as a reliable  cyclical  indicator  in and of itself. I have  taken  the series  of monthly 
changes  in the stock price  index, made a reverse  trend  adjustment  in it, and tested  it in 
exactly  the same  way as the CLI was tested  in Table  5. The results  are striking.  The stock 
market  index yields a false-peak  rate of 69.3 percent  compared  with 49.1 percent  for the 
CLI! There  are fifty-two  false peak predictions  and only twenty-three  appropriate  peak 
predictions  for the stock  market  index,  compared  with  twenty-eight  false  and twenty-nine 
appropriate  peak predictions  for the CLI. 
30. I did not carry  out the complex procedure  corresponding  to the sketchy outline 
provided  above (pp. 343-48). Instead,  I used  the historically  revised  data to run a regres- 
sion of the monthly  changes  in the CLI on the monthly  changes  in its components  (ex- 
cluding  profits,  for which  monthly  changes  are  not meaningful).  This  regression  provided 
a very  tight fit and is not subject  to the criticism  surrounding  Table 2 because  the CLI is 356  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
Table 7.  Turning  Point Test of the Composite Leading Indicator, 1956-71a 
Realized  result 
Percent  of 
Total  predicted 
No  observa-  turns  that 
Predicted  result  change  Peak  Troughi  tions  are  falseb 
No change (NC)  131  14  8  153  ... 
Peak (P)  13  13  0  26  50.0 
Trough  (T)  0  0  11  11  0 
Total observations  144  27  19  190  ... 
Percent of realized turns 
that are missedo  ...  51.9  42.1  ...  ... 
Source: Calculations by author. 
a.  To test independence: obs. x2 =  135.4; X24;  o.o0 = 13.3, where the symbols are defined asin Table 5, 
note a. 
b. See Table 5, note b. 
c.  See Table 5, note c. 
always  based  on eleven  components  (see  note 30)  and  should  therefore  be at 
least  as reliable  as the preliminary  estimates  of the kind  now  regularly  pub- 
lished  in BCD. In testing  these  data,  I have applied  exactly  the same  rules 
as previously,  except that the two consecutive  CLI changes  to be con- 
sidered  for  month  t are  the  preliminary  for t and  the  first  revision  for t -  1. 
In other  words,  an incorrect  preliminary  sign for t -  1  will not affect  the 
prediction  for month t +  1 if the first revision  corrects  the preliminary 
error. 
I am able  to conduct  a turning  point  test  of these  data  only  for  the period 
since 1956.  To provide  a valid  comparison,  Table  7 gives  the results  for the 
historical  CLI  for the 1956-71  period;  the results  for the preliminary-first 
revision  CLI are contained  in Table 8. Note first  that the historical  CLI 
itself  fares  less  well  in the 1956-71  subperiod  than  in the  full  period  1948-71. 
in fact constructed  as a linear function of its components.  I then calculated  two error 
series  for each leading  indicator  component:  one representing  the difference  between  the 
preliminary  and the historically  revised  change for each month; the other representing 
the difference  between the first revision and the historically  revised change for each 
month. I then used the coefficient  estimates  from the regression  equation to build the 
preliminary  errors  into the historically  revised  ACLI  series,  yielding  a preliminary  ACLI 
series. Finally, I used the coefficient  estimates  to build the first-revision  errors  into the 
historically  revised series. For 1956-60 I used preliminary  and first-revision  data for 
those series  for which I had them, and the historically  revised  data for the rest. I would 
think that this biases the results  in favor of the preliminary-first  revision CLI, but it is 
vaguely  possible that I have eliminated  some offsetting  errors  and therefore  biased the 
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Table 8.  Turning  Point Test of Preliminary-First  Revision Composite 
Leading Indicator, 1956-71a 
Realized  result 
Percent  of 
Total  predicted 
No  observa-  turns  that 
Predicted  result  change  Peak  Trough  tions  are  falseb 
No change  (NC)  130  9  8  147  ... 
Peak(P)  13  19  0  32  40.6 
Trough  (T)  0  0  11  11  0 
Total observations  143  28  19  190  ... 
Percent of realized turns 
that are missedc  ...  32.1  42.1  ...  ... 
Source: Calculations by author. 
a.  To test independence:  obs. x2  =  164.7; X24; O.01 = 13.3, where symbols are defined  as in Table 5, note a. 
b. See Table 5, note b. 
c.  See Table 5, note c. 
The  false-peak  rate  is still 50 percent  but the missed  turns  are  considerably 
more  numerous  (relatively).  The  most  amazing  result,  however,  comes  from 
the comparison  of Tables  7 and 8. The preliminary-first  revision  CLI out- 
performs  the historically  revised  CLI.  The  margin  of difference  is not great 
-the  false-peak  rate  is down  to "only"  40.6  percent-but it is all one-sided. 
Table  9 provides  further  evidence  in terms  of the leads at turning  points. 
Compared  with  the comparable  turns  in Table  4, no leads  have  shortened, 
and one, that at the 1969  peak,  is longer  by five  months. 
I had fully  expected  that  the preliminary-first  revision  data would prove 
inferior  to the revised  data.  In retrospect  I see the obvious  reason  why  my 
initial  expectations  were  wrong.  The entire  procedure  being  evaluated  de- 
pends  only on the sign of a change  in the CLI,  not its magnitude.  This  is a 
weakness  in the sense  that  no attempt  is being  made  to extract  quantitative 
Table  9. Unofficial  Leads  and  Lags  of the Preliminary-First  Revision 
Composite  Leading  Indicator  at Cyclical  Turning  Points,  1956-71 
Lead(-)  Lead(-) 
orlag(+)  orlag(+) 
Peak  (months)  Trough  (months) 
July 1957  missed  April 1958  +1 
May 1960  -1  February  1961  +1 
December  1966  -6  March 1967  +2 
November 1969  -4  November 1970  -3 
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information  from  the CLI;  but  it becomes  a strength  when  the forecaster  is 
at the mercy  of preliminary  data.  While  the preliminary  and first-revision 
CLI contain  many quantitatively  large  errors,  there  are only 16 (out of a 
possible  190)  incorrect  preliminary  signs,  8 of which  are  correctly  revised  a 
month later. In no case are two consecutive  preliminary  signs  incorrect, 
and  in only  two cases  are  both  a preliminary  and  the  preceding  first-revision 
signs  incorrect.31 
In closing  this section,  I hasten  to reiterate  that, though  the preliminary- 
first  revision  CLI outperformed  a poor competitor,  it by no means  per- 
formed  so well as to confirm  that a reliable  cyclical  indicator  was in hand. 
Spectral Analysis of the Leading Indicators 
In this  section  I shall  attempt  to deal  with  two factors  already  noted.  The 
first  is the  tendency  of the CLI,  as now constructed,  to produce  an excessive 
number  of false peak signals.  The second  is the fact, noted in connection 
with Table 1, that the twelve  series  of leading  indicators  do not coincide 
with  each other  in their  median  lead  times,  and that each  exhibits  extreme 
variability  around  its own median  lead time.  A technique  that can be em- 
ployed  most  profitably  to shed  light on these  matters  is spectral  analysis,  a 
statistical  procedure  for ferreting  out the cyclical  components  of a time 
series.32 
Roughly  speaking,  spectral  analysis  views  a time series  as the sum of a 
number  of other  time  series,  each  of which  is a periodic  series  with  a specific 
amplitude.  Thus  a given  time  series,  A, may  be thought  of as the sum  of the 
series  A1, A2, and A3, where  A1 is a series  that exhibits  large amplitude 
cycles  with  a five-year  periodicity,  A2  is a series  that  exhibits  small  amplitude 
cycles  with  a two-year  periodicity,  and  A3  is a series  that  exhibits  very  small 
amplitude  cycles  with  a two-quarter  periodicity.  One  could  then  regard  the 
series  A as one with a major  cycle component  (Al), a minor cycle com- 
ponent  (A2),  and a very  short  cycle  component  (A3). If A1,  A2, and  A3 are 
31. I also believe,  as discussed  in note 30 and subsequently,  that my test was to some 
extent biased  in favor of the preliminary-first  revision  test of the CLI. 
32. Some useful references  on spectral analysis are Granger, in association with 
Hatanaka, Spectral Analysis; George S. Fishman, Spectral Methods  in Econometrics 
(Harvard  University Press, 1969); and Marc Nerlove, "Spectral  Analysis of Seasonal 
Adjustment  Procedures,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 32 (July 1964),  pp. 241-86. Saul H. Hymans  359 
random time series (or stochastic  processes),  then the periodicity  and 
amplitude  of each  is an approximate  or average  value  and  A3  is the  random 
noise component  of the series  A. Empirical  spectral  analysis  succeeds  in 
decomposing  virtually  any observed  time  series  into a set of approximately 
periodic  components  that sum  to the original  time  series,33  and provides  a 
measure,  referred  to as the "power,"  of how much of the variance  of the 
original  time series  is attributable  to each of the approximately  periodic 
components.  If a time series  has been decomposed  into a twenty-period 
cycle  and  a five-period  cycle  with  powers  of 5 and 10,  respectively,  then  the 
short-period  cycle  accounts  (empirically)  for twice  as much  of the variance 
of the original  time series  as does the long-period  cycle.  The periodicities 
into which  a time series  is decomposed,  along with the power  measure  at 
each  periodicity,  is known  as the "spectrum"  or "power  spectrum"  of the 
time series. 
One  may  also compute  a cross-spectrum  between  two time  series.  In this 
case  each  time series  is decomposed  into components  of the same  approxi- 
mate  periodicity-say,  three  components  with  approximate  periodicities  of 
twenty  months,  eight  months,  and  five  months.  The  cross-spectrum  calcula- 
tion provides  two important  measures  for each periodicity:  the "squared 
coherence,"  which is essentially  the square  of the correlation  between  a 
periodic  component  of one series  and the like component  of the other; 
and  a "phase"  displacement,  which  is the approximate  number  of time  units 
(months,  for example)  separating  the peaks  (or troughs)  of a periodic  com- 
ponent  of one series  and the like periodic  component  of the other.34 
The proper  application  of spectral  analysis  does not require  that a time 
series  actually  be generated  by purely  cyclical  phenomena,  in the sense of 
an endogenous  Metzlerian  inventory  cycle superimposed  upon an endog- 
enous  Hicksian  business  fixed  investment  cycle.35  I am not especially  fond 
of any theory  proposing  an endogenous,  self-perpetuating  business  cycle. 
33. Just as least squares  will provide  the best fit between  two variables  whether  they 
have anything  to do with each other or not. 
34. If the eight-month  periodicity  components of the two time series have a phase 
displacement  of two months (one leads the other by two months), the cross-spectrum 
calculation  "aligns"  the series  before  computing  the squared  coherence.  Thus a squared 
coherence  of 0.90 would mean that, with proper  aligning  of the components,  90 percent 
of the variance  of one approximate  eight-month  cycle can be explained  by the other 
approximate  eight-month  cycle. 
35. Of course, if the time series were  to be so generated,  the spectral  decomposition 
would  factor into those cycles. :'.  8  t,  o- 
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But casual  empiricism  and the behavior  of econometric  models do offer 
convincing  evidence  that the economy responds  to various  stimuli in a 
damped  cyclic fashion; that, depending  on the nature  of the particular 
stimulus,  this  cyclical  response  mechanism  may  exhibit  a number  of waves 
of long or short  period  and of large  or small  amplitude  before  dying  out; 
and that in any period  of time the economy  may well be responding  to 
several  stimuli  simultaneously.  The decomposition  of an aggregative  time 
series  into components  with perhaps  two- to five-year  periodicities  is-in 
this view-a  meaningful  way to inquire  into what is generally  and inac- 
curately  known  as "the  business  cycle."36 
Table  10  contains  the power  spectra  calculated  for the deflated  CCI,  the 
reverse  trend  adjusted  CLI,  and  each  of the components  of the CLI  (except 
for corporate  profits).  In each case the spectrum  was calculated  for the 
monthly  first  differences  of the time  series  in question  over  the period  1948 
through  mid-1972.  Since  the power  itself is in different  units for different 
series, I have expressed  the spectra  in relative  terms, showing for each 
periodicity  of a given series  its power  relative  to the power  of the forty- 
month  periodicity.37 
In the power spectrum  for the CCI, the twenty-four-  to sixty-month 
periodicities  clearly  dominate.  In other  words,  approximate  cycles  of two- 
to five-year  periodicity  account  for far  more  of the  variance  of the  CCI  than 
do any cycles  of shorter  periodicity.38  The CLI,  constructed  so as to signal 
the major  cyclical  movements  in the CCI, displays  a very  similar  spectral 
pattern involving clear dominance of the twenty-four-  to  sixty-month 
periodicities.  The shorter  periodicities  in the range  of two to eight  months 
can hardly  be interpreted  as components  of the business  cycles  that  are  the 
36. One might well wish to consider a periodicity  of about eight years-the  classic 
Juglar  cycle-but  here  a statistical  problem  arises.  In a time series  of about 300 months 
(1948-72), one could observe  at most three  eight-year  cycles; that is simply too few for 
spectral  techniques  to produce a reliable estimate of a component with an eight-year 
periodicity. 
37. The forty-month  periodicity  is a convenient  base since most of the series  in ques- 
tion exhibit their maximum  long-periodicity  power at forty months, which is surely 
relevant  for the analysis  of business  cycles. 
38. The first difference  transformation  affords  a more reliable  look at the spectrum 
but may have the effect  of slightly  exaggerating  the importance  of the forty- and thirty- 
month periodicities  relative  to the sixty-month  periodicity.  It is important  to consider  a 
rather  fine breakdown  of periodicities  in the two- to twelve-month  range  because  it is the 
flatness of the spectrum  over such a range that permits  the conclusion that the short- 
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focus of this paper.  Rather,  they correspond  to what  must  be regarded  as 
short-period  disturbances,  minor  spurts  and stalls  resulting  from  any  num- 
ber of events that continually  intrude  on the underlying  course of the 
economy.  They are not, however,  trivial  with respect  to the performance 
of the CLI.  They  are  present  in both the CCI  and the CLI  and correspond 
to the occasional  reversals-or short  string  of reversals-that  occur  in each 
of the series  during  an otherwise  unidirectional  movement;  that is to say, 
they correspond  to the false signals  often displayed  by the CLI. The CLI 
has, in a sense,  reproduced  the CCI  too faithfully.  While  showing  the same 
behavior  as the CCI with respect  to the periodicities  of interest,  it is also 
duplicating  the tendency  to exhibit  aberrant  phase  reversals  that give the 
same  signal  as a true  business  cycle  phenomenon;  the CLI  does  not succeed 
in filtering  out all movements  that are  pure  noise  from  the point  of view  of 
the reference  cycle. 
An inspection  of the spectra  for the short  list variables  yields  some  clues 
to the noise phenomenon.  Every one of the leading indicator  variables 
exhibits  a relative  peak  in its power  spectrum  at either  the thirty-  or forty- 
month  periodicity,  which,  of course,  is precisely  what  makes  each  a poten- 
tial cyclical  indicator  of some sort.39  But contrast  business  formation  and 
inventory  change.  By itself,  business  formation  has a spectrum  very  much 
like that  of the CCI:  substantial  power  in the long periodicities,  and  much 
less power in the noise range.  Inventory  change,  on the other hand, is 
totally  dominated  by noise-by  brief  up and down  spurts  that  account  for 
far more  variance  than do the longer  cycles.  Materials  prices  has a nearly 
ideal  spectrum  for a leading  indicator:  dominant  power  in the long period- 
icities, and little noise. Unfortunately,  its long-period  cycles  are not well 
correlated  with  those  of the  CCI  and  its lead  times  leave  much  to be desired. 
Most of the other  leading  series  fall somewhere  in between  business  forma- 
tion and inventory  change  in their  spectral  patterns,  but with a tendency 
toward  much  noise.  In view  of the spectral  contrast  between  the CLI  and  its 
components,  the noise  elements  in the component  series  apparently  are  not 
highly  correlated,  while  the  long-period  elements  are.  The  averaging  process 
therefore  results  in the CLI exhibiting  relatively  little noise, but still too 
much. 
Table  11  contains  the cross-spectrum  results  for the CCI  and CLI  series. 
39. I call the data  in Table 10 "potential"  indicators  because  they give no information 
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Table 11.  Cross-Spectral  Statistics for the Change in the Composite 
Coincident  Indicator  vs. the Composite  Leading Indicator 
Phase lead (-) 
or lag (+)  of 
Periodicity  Squared  CLI relative  to 
(months)  coherence  CCI (months) 
60  0.85  -7.6 
40  0.92  -4.3 
30  0.93  -2.8 
24  0.83  -2.3 
20  0.54  -1.5 
12  0.46  +0.1 
8  0.49  -0.2 
6  0.35  -0.2 
4.8  0.19  -0.4 
4  0.14  -0.3 
3.4  0.18  0.0 
3  0.19  +0.2 
2.7  0.11  0.0 
2.4  0.10  0.0 
2.2  0.16  +0.1 
2  0.10  +0.1 
Source: Calculated by author from time series for the period from 1948 to mid-1972. 
Three  conclusions  stand  out. First,  the long-period  cycles  in the two series 
are very  highly  correlated:  the CLI is potentially  a good predictor  of the 
major  swings  exhibited  by the CCI.  Second,  the CLI  clearly  leads  the CCI 
in the major  cycles,  but by a highly  variable  period,  extending  from  more 
than seven and one-half  months  in the five-year  cycle component  to less 
than  two and one-half  months  in the two-year  cycle  component.  The  impli- 
cation is that, even if all goes well, the lead time of the CLI will be highly 
unreliable,  depending  on what kind of cyclical  response  mechanism  hap- 
pens  to be dominating  the business  cycle  turn.  The  third  point  involves  the 
poor correlation  in the noise  range:  a false  signal  of the CLI  need  not even 
correspond  to an impending  aberration  in the path of the CCI. I submit 
that it would  be highly  desirable  if the CLI exhibited  less noise and if its 
lead  time  were  substantially  more  uniform  in the  major  cycle  components.40 
40. It might  be argued  that long notice  is more  important  in the case of an impending 
major downturn  than a minor downturn.  But that is not the message  of Table 11. Re- 
member  that all the postwar  downturns  have been short, and 1957-58,  the sharpest  post- 
war recession,  was among  the shortest.  Also remember  that all of the periodicities  oper- 
ate simultaneously,  and to justify  a desire  for the lead time  to vary  with the magnitude  of 
the impending  phase  requires  pinpointing  of the major  cause of the turn ahead of time. m~~~~~~e  m  tn  tn0CoO 
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Underlying  the variable  lead  time  exhibited  by the CLI  is the fact  that  it 
is constructed  by a contemporaneous  averaging  of a dozen  series,  each of 
which  exhibits  a variable  lead  time  pattern.  I have  already  pointed  this out 
in connection  with  Table 1. It is even  more  graphically  displayed  in Table 
12,  which  contains  the cross-spectrum  statistics  for the CCI  compared  with 
each of the leading  indicator  series whose power spectrum  is shown in 
Table  10.  In Table  12,  I have  shown  only the major  cycle  periodicities  and 
a selection  of the noise  components;  the format  is the same  as in Table  1  1, 
showing  first  the squared  coherence  (C2)  and then the phase  lead or lag, 
one  series  at a time.  The  average  workweek  in manufacturing,  initial  claims 
for unemployment  insurance,  and new orders  for durable  goods  stand  out 
with  the highest  degree  of explanatory  power  in the long periodicities,  but 
their  lead  times  are  quite  short  for the thirty-  and  twenty-four-month  com- 
ponents.  In the case of the workweek,  for example,  the lead time ranges 
from six and one-half  months in the five-year  cycle down to only two 
months  in the two-year  cycle. Materials  prices,  which  had a nearly  ideal 
spectral  pattern,  can be classed  as a leading  series  only for the very  longest 
cycle and has relatively  low explanatory  power, except possibly  for the 
thirty-month  cycle,  where  it lags  the CCI  by nearly  two months.  Plant  and 
equipment  contracts  exhibits  quite  long lead  times  but has surprisingly  low 
coherence.4'  Net business  formation  stands  alone as the indicator  that  has 
both reasonably  high coherence  and a uniform  lead time throughout  the 
long periodicities.42  The unmistakable  modal result is reasonably  high 
coherence  with substantial  variability  in lead time. 
The data in Tables 10 to 12 provide  important  information  about the 
properties  of the indicator  series  and the results  obtained  in the turning 
point  tests  conducted  earlier.  This  information  can  be used  in an attempt  to 
improve  the results. 
SLI: An Alternative  to the CLI 
I shall  use  the  results  discussed  in previous  sections  to suggest  an alterna- 
tive technique  for the construction  of a cyclical  indicator.  I maintain  the 
basic  assumption,  discussed  earlier,  that  in the construction  of an  indicator, 
41. Its lead time in the five-year  cycle is so close to half the cycle length that it is not 
clear whether it  should be considered a long lead or a  long lag;  either could be 
rationalized. 
42. It is interesting  to note, in this connection,  that net business  formation  is the very 
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it is desirable  to combine  many  potentially  duplicative  signals  of the same 
impending  event.  But, in contrast  to the NBER time-domain  technique,  I 
shall  focus  on the cyclical  components  that  are  to be predicted.  Specifically, 
I shall  use the spectral  and  cross-spectral  statistics  to construct  one indica- 
tor component  corresponding  to each  of the four  major  cycle  periodicities 
that have been discussed:  sixty,  forty,  thirty,  and twenty-four  months.  In 
the construction  of each of these  components,  I shall  attempt  to highlight 
the  corresponding  cycle  while  minimizing  the noise  content.  I shall  then  use 
the  information  in the CCI  spectrum  to combine  the four  indicator  compo- 
nents  into a single  indicator,  which  I shall  refer  to as the "spectral  leading 
indicator"  (SLI). 
The construction  of the SLI is best illustrated  by an example  using  the 
hypothetical  data in Table 13. Two series,  X and Z, are considered  to be 
leading  indicators  for the series Y. Periodicity  P4  is a noise component, 
while  pi, P2,  and  p3  correspond  to the "real  cycles"  the SLI is to predict. 
Assume,  for ease of exposition,  that all three  series  have  comparable  units 
of measurement  and have  trivial  power  at  P4. 
The  indicator  component  for periodicity  pi, say II, is constructed  as 
(2)  I(t)  =  v  8X(t-)  +  V  Z(t  -  7) 
Since  X leads Y  by five  months  atpi, and  Z leads Y by seven  months  at  pi, 
I average  X and  Z with  the indicated  lags. The weights  in the average  are 
the coherences  (v/C),  so that X carries  appropriately  more  weight  than  Z 
Table 13. Hypothetical Spectral and Cross-Spectral  Statistics, 
Three Series 
Series X  Series  Z 
Phase lead  Phase lead 
Series Y  (-)  or lag  (-)  or lag 
Squared  (+)  Squared  (+) 
Periodicity  Power  coherence  (months)  coherence  (months) 
Pi  2  0.8  -5  0.5  -7 
P2  3  0.6  -2  0.9  -5 
p3  2  0.9  +1  0.6  -5 
pa  0.01  0.1  -1  0.2  -1 
Source: Hypothetical data constructed by author. See discussion in text. Saul H. Hymans  367 
in predicting  the pi  component  of Y. The indicator  component  for pe- 
riodicity  P2 is similarly  defined: 
(3)  I2(t) 
=  --6 X(t-2)  +  9Z(t-5) 
In this  case,  Z receives  the higher  weight.  In the case of the  P3 indicator  the 
X variable  must  be disregarded,  despite  its high  explanatory  power,  since  it 
is a lagging  indicator  at P3. Thus: 
(4)  13(t) =  Z(t  -  5). 
Note that  Z(t -  5) has been used twice,  in I2 and again  in I3. 
In combining  I,, I2, and 13  into a single indicator,  I use the power of 
the Y  series,  which  indicates  that  the  P2 periodicity  is of greater  importance 
than either  pI or  p3. Thus: 
(5)  SLI(t) =  v2  I(t)  +  3 I2(t) +  '2 I3(t) 
In averaging  the components  to obtain the SLI, the square  roots of the 
power  measures  are  used  since  the power  represents  a variance  decomposi- 
tion.  Note that  the SLI,  as constructed  in this  example,  becomes  "available" 
two months  prior  to the date to which  it refers. 
The  hypothetical  example  fails  to bring  out three  points  that  are  of great 
relevance  for the practical  application  of the method  to the leading  indica- 
tors.  The  first  is that  the short  list indicators  do not have  comparable  units 
of measurement.  I have  handled  this  in essentially  the same  fashion  that  the 
NBER employs  in the construction  of the CLI: the monthly  changes  in 
each  leading  indicator  series  have  been  normalized  by dividing  through  by 
the average  absolute  monthly  change  over  the sample.  The second  is that 
the power of the noise components  of the leading  indicator  series  is not 
at all trivial.  I have  treated  this problem  as follows: if the cross-spectrum 
indicates  that  the change  in BCD,  leads  that in CCI  by, say, seven  months 
at a particular  frequency,  and if the spectrum  of change  in BCD, exhibits 
substantial  noise (which  is true of all of the series  except  for the changes 
in business  formation,  stock prices,  and materials  prices),  then I use 
ABCDT(t  -  6) +  ABCDi(t -  7) +  ABCDi(t -  8) 
3 
instead  of ABCDi(t  -  7) itself in the construction  of the indicator  com- 368  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
Table 14.  Spectral and Cross-Spectral  Statistics for the Spectral 
Leading Indicator  and the Change in the Composite Coincident 
Indicator 
Cross  spectrum 
Phase lead (-) 
orlag(+)  of 
Periodicity  SLI  Squared  SLI relative  to 
(months)  spectrum  coherence  CCI (months) 
60  0.62  0.81  -3.2 
40  1.00  0.90  -2.1 
30  1.01  0.91  -0.9 
24  0.67  0.83  -0.6 
20  0.26  0.50  +0.2 
12  0.04  0.11  +1.1 
8  0.05  0.35  +0.6 
6  0.03  0.13  +0.4 
4.8  0.02  0.06  +0.0 
4  0.01  0.00  -0.3 
3.4  0.01  0.04  +0.8 
3  0.005  0.14  +0.4 
2.7  0.005  0.10  -0.1 
2.4  0.004  0.04  -0.6 
2.2  0.003  0.00  -0.6 
2  0.002  0.01  -0.7 
Source: Constructed by author from spectral and cross-spectral statistics in Tables 11 and 12. 
ponent.43  Finally,  I found-for the same  reasons  mentioned  in connection 
with  the CLI-that a reverse  trend  adjustment  was needed.  The final SLI, 
then, has exactly  the same  time trend  as the change  in the CCI.44 
Table 14 contains  the spectrum  of the SLI and the cross-spectrum  sta- 
tistics  for the SLI  and the change  in the CCI.  The spectrum  of the SLI  dis- 
plays  very  clear  dominance  of the long periodicities  and an extremely  low 
noise level. Further,  the long-period  cycles  in the SLI have very  high co- 
herence  with  the corresponding  components  of the CCI,  and  the phasing  is 
reasonably  uniform  in the twenty-four-  to sixty-month  components.  The- 
43. There  are two exceptions  to this averaging  rule. For the twenty-four-month  com- 
ponent I averaged  only two monthly changes, for the workweek  and unemployment 
claims. The indicated  lead was two months  in each case, and I did not wish to use any 
data not "available"  at least two months  in advance.  I also disregarded  leads of twenty 
months or more in the interest  of not losing too many data points. 
44. The SLI is itself a change  indicator,  not a levels indicator,  since it is constructed 
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oretically,  the SLI  should  lead  the CCI  by two months  since  the SLI  dated 
in month t is based on data available  two months  prior  to month t. The 
phase  results  are  not perfectly  uniform  in the twenty-four-  to sixty-month 
components,  but the average  lead is 1.7 months  and  the range  is only 2.6 
months  compared  with  a spread  of 5.3  months  in the  cross-spectrum  results 
for changes  in the CLI and CCI  (see Table 1  1).45 
The results  in Table 14 are reasonably  encouraging.  False peaks will 
probably  be substantially  less troublesome  with  the SLI  than  with  the CLI. 
The  major  cyclical  movements  of the CCI ought  to be very  well  defined  by 
the SLI.  However,  the lead time is apt to be shorter  than one might  wish. 
Turning  Point  Tests of the SLI 
The turning  point tests on the SLI are conducted  under  the same  rules 
employed  for the CLI,  with one exception.  In the case of the CLI,  the pre- 
diction  of a turning  point  required  two consecutive  negatives  during  an up- 
swing  or  two consecutive  positives  during  a downswing.  The  purpose  of this 
requirement  was  to filter  out false  signals.  The SLI,  however,  has  been  con- 
structed  so as to highlight  the long-period  cycles while minimizing  the 
short-period  noise. It is therefore  reasonable  to expect that additional 
filtering  is unnecessary.  In the case of the SLI,  I count  any negative  during 
an upswing  as a peak signal, and any positive  during  a downswing  as a 
trough  signal.46 
Table  15  presents  the  leads  and  lags  of the SLI  for  the  turning  points  since 
1949.  The 1948  peak  is not an available  turning  point  for  the SLI  since  thir- 
teen  observations  are  lost at the beginning  of the sample  period  in the con- 
struction  process.  Those  components  of the SLI  that become  available  the 
earliest  do show declines  right  from  the start  in mid-1948,  and the SLI it- 
self quite  likely  would  have  led the 1948  peak by at least several  months; 
45. I am unhappy  about the statistics  for the twenty-month  periodicity,  and would 
like to have  included  a.twenty-month  component  in the SLI. As Table 12  reveals,  though, 
there  simply  are no long lead-high coherence  results  for the twenty-month  periodicity. 
The cross-spectrum  results for the SLI at the twenty-month  cycle (and possibly the 
twenty-four-month  cycle as well, which shows a lead of only 0.6 month) provide  a clue 
that the SLI may not pick up troughs  well whenever  the downswing  is dominated  by the 
shorter  of the long periodicities. 
46. If a peak signal has occurred,  it takes only one positive to define  a false peak; a 
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Table 15. Leads and Lags of the Spectral Leading Indicator at Cyclical 
Turning  Points, 1949-71 
Lead(-)  Lead(-) 
orlag(+)  orlag(+) 
Peak  (months)  Trough  (months) 
October 1949  0 
July 1953  -1  August 1954  -3 
July 1957  -2  April 1958  +2 
May 1960  0  February  1961  +2 
December  1966  0  March 1967  +2 
November 1969  0  November 1970  -3 
Source: Same as Table 14. 
but I have made no attempt  to approximate  the lead and have simply 
omitted  the 1948 peak from Table 15. A comparison  of Table 15 with 
Table  4 reveals  a tendency  for the SLI to exhibit  somewhat  shorter  leads 
than the CLI. The differences,  however,  are exaggerated  by the absence 
from  Table 15 of the 1948  peak,  at which  the CLI  exhibits  its longest  lead. 
The two major  differences  at peaks  occur  in 1957  and at the mini-peak  in 
1966.  In the latter  case, the CLI exhibits  a six-month  lead, while  the SLI 
coincides  at the peak.  The SLI  very  clearly  dominates  the CLI at the 1957 
peak.  While  the CLI  misses  the peak  entirely,  the SLI  leads  by two months. 
At troughs  the SLI  is never  better  than the CLI  and performs  as well only 
in the case of the 1967  and 1970  turns. 
Comparison  of the  performance  of the  two indicators  suggests  that,  while 
the differences  are not great,  the CLI has the clear edge in terms  of lead 
time.47  This loss of lead time cannot be worth  bearing  unless  the SLI is 
substantially  superior  to the CLI  in terms  of its false-peak  properties.  Re- 
call that the CLI provided  twenty-eight  false peak signals  in the 1948-71 
period  (see  Table  5). None of these  occurred  prior  to 1949,  and a compari- 
son with  the number  of false  peak  signals  for the SLI  in the 1949-71  period 
is therefore  relevant.  Compared  with  twenty-eight  false  peak  signals  for the 
CLI,  the SLI  series  records  only seven,  one-fourth  as many.48  The missing 
SLI  data  in 1948  make  it impossible  to present  a two-way  table  equivalent 
to Table  5, but  Table  16  presents  the data  on the SLI  for  the 1956-71  period 
47. One would have to give huge weight  to the 1957 peak to reverse  this conclusion. 
48. In fact, five of the seven false peak months arise as a single string  of predictions 
starting  in mid-1951  and containing  a four-month  period  during  which  the deflated  CCI 
remained  essentially  flat. This corresponds  to the April 1951  peak prediction  of the CLI 
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and is directly  comparable  to Table 7. The conclusions  are immediately 
clear.  The false-peak  rate  for the SLI is only 13.3  percent,  compared  with 
50 percent  for the CLI over the same period.  The SLI exhibits  the same 
number  of correct  peak  predictions  (thirteen)  as the CLI,  and misses  fewer 
months  when it should be giving a peak signal.  The combined  evidence 
from  Tables  15 and 16  implies  that  the SLI  is more  consistent  across  peaks 
than  the  CLI,  and  is far  superior  with  respect  to false  peak  signals.  Table  16 
does reveal, however,  that the SLI performs  less well than the CLI at 
troughs.  The CLI exhibits  no false  trough  signals  during  1956-71,  the SLI 
shows  two; the CLI failed  to pick up eight of the nineteen  months that 
should have carried  a trough prediction,  the SLI failed in eleven. This 
finding  is merely  a reaffirmation  of the trough  comparison  made in con- 
nection  with Table 15. 
Compared  to the CLI,  the SLI  exhibits  an extremely  low false-signal  rate 
and is more consistent  at the peaks,  but at the cost of somewhat  poorer 
lead-time  performance.  A substantially  longer  lead  time might  be worth  a 
few more  false  signals.  To this end, I have  experimented  with an alternate 
SLI that should  provide  longer  leads at the turning  points. The SLI was 
constructed  by employing  cross-spectral  leads of two months  or more.  In 
the construction  of the alternate  SLI,  I required  cross-spectral  leads  of five 
months  or more  and thus  disregarded  a number  of short  leads  that exhibit 
quite  high coherence  with the CCI. The leading  indicator  unemployment 
claims,  for example,  exhibits  short leads and high coherence  at the three 
longest  business  cycle periodicities:  a 3.9-month  lead at the sixty-month 
Table 16. Turning Point Test of the Spectral Leading Indicator, 1956-71a 
Realized  result 
Percent  of 
Total  predicted 
No  observa-  turns  that 
Predicted  result  change  Peak  Trough  tions  are  falseb 
No change  (NC)  143  11  11  165  ... 
Peak(P)  2  13  0  15  13.3 
Trough  (T)  2  0  8  10  20.0 
Total observations  147  24  19  190  ... 
Percent  of realized  turns 
that are misseda  ...  45.8  57.9 
Source: Calculations by author. 
a. To test independence:  obs. X2  137.  1; X24;  0.01  =  13.3, where symbols are as defined  in Table 5, note a. 
b. See Table 5, note b. 
c.  See Table 5, note c. 372  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1973 
Table 17. Leads and Lags of the Alternate Spectral Leading Indicator at 
Cyclical Turning  Points, 1949-71 
Lead (-)  Lead(-) 
or lag (+)  or lag (+) 
Peak  (months)  Trough  (months) 
October  1949  -1 
July 1953  -1  August 1954  -6 
July 1957  +2  April 1958  0 
May 1960  -2  February  1961  -1 
December  1966  -7  March 1967  0 
November 1969  -3  November 1970  -1 
Source: Calculations by author. 
cycle  (C2  =  0.80), a 3.4-month  lead at the forty-month  cycle  (C2 =  0.86), 
and a 2.5-month  lead at the twenty-four-month  cycle  (C2 5/8 0.91). All of 
these  leading  signals  are  included  in the corresponding  components  of the 
SLI;  none  is included  in the alternate  SLI.  The alternate  SLI  is thus "avail- 
able"  as a cyclical  indicator  with  three  months  more  lead  time  than  the SLI 
itself.49  But it is inherently  less reliable  than the SLI  and may therefore  be 
expected  to exhibit  more  false  turn  signals  in addition  to longer  lead  times. 
The  improvement  in the lead  times  resulting  from  the use of the alternate 
SLI  is striking  and can be seen by comparing  Table 17 with  Table  15. The 
results  shown  in Table 17 are  clearly  superior  to those of the SLI.  At only 
two turning  points-1957 and 1970-is the SLI superior;  at all other  turns 
the alternate  SLI exhibits  the same or longer  leads, ranging  up to seven 
months  longer  at peaks,  and  from  one to three  months  longer at troughs. 
Considering  all  peaks  and  all  troughs,  the average  lead  is about  two months 
longer  for the alternate  SLI over all turning  points. In fact, the alternate 
SLI can be judged  to be superior  even to the CLI at the turns  shown  for 
both: at four out of five peaks,  the leads are longer  for the alternate  SLI 
than for the CLI; and at four out of six troughs,  the leads are at least as 
long for the alternate  SLI as for the CLI. 
The false-peak  record  is not as favorable  for the alternate  SLI  as for the 
SLI  itself,  but  it is superior  to that  for the CLI.  During  the 1949-71  period, 
49. For example, the SLI constructed  using data through January 1960 refers to 
March 1960; the alternate  SLI constructed  using data through  January  1960 refers  to 
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Table  18. Turning  Point  Test of Alternate  Spectral  Leading  Indicator, 
1956-71a 
Realized  result 
Percent  of 
Total  predicted 
No  observa-  turns  that 
Predicted  result  change  Peak  Trough  tions  are  falseb 
No change  (NC)  132  9  4  145  ... 
Peak (P)  12  19  0  31  38.7 
Trough  (T)  0  0  14  14  0 
Total observations  144  28  18  190  ... 
Percent of realized turns 
that are missedo  ...  32.1  22.2  ...  ... 
Source: Calculations by author. 
a.  To test independence:  obs. X2  =  208.9; X24;  0.01  =  13.3, where  symbols are as defined in Table 5, note a. 
b. See Table 5, note b. 
c.  See Table 5, note c. 
the alternate  SLI  exhibits  twenty  false  peak  predictions,  nearly  three  times 
as many  as the SLI  itself,  but  eight  fewer  than  the CLI.50  Table  18  contains 
the two-way  table  of prediction  results  for the 1956-71  period.  A compari- 
son with Table 16 reveals  that the alternate  SLI is superior  to the SLI in 
every  statistic  with  the very  clear  exception  of the false-peak  rate.  A com- 
parison  with Table  7 shows  the alternate  SLI  to be slightly  better  than the 
CLI with respect  to false  peaks.5' 
It is indeed  possible  to trade  off false signals  and lead time. I have re- 
ported  on one experiment  that yields  such a result.  For reasons  that I will 
try to make  clear  in the concluding  section,  I have  not pursued  the matter 
any  further.  Suffice  it to say  here  that  one  can  readily  improve  upon  the CLI 
as an indicator  of major  turning  points.  This  section  has shown  that  a spec- 
tral  leading  indicator-based  on no more  raw  data  than  the CLI  employs- 
can be constructed  to exhibit  (a) at least as good leading  behavior  as the 
CLI at the recognized  turns  in economic  activity,  and (b) an appreciably 
better  record  with respect  to false turn  signals. 
50. The prediction  rules  employed  for the alternate  SLI are identical  to those for the 
SLI; no additional  filtering  was used despite the fact that the alternate  SLI should be 
expected  to be a good deal noisier than the SLI itself. 
51. The 1956-71 period exaggerates  the closeness  of the false-peak  rate for the alter- 
nate SLI and the CLI; over the longer, 1949-71, period the CLI was distinctly  worse 
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Summary  and  Recommendations 
In this  study  I have  attempted  to provide  a fairly  complete  analysis  of the 
performance  of the existing  composite  index of leading  indicators  as a 
predictor  of the major  swings  in economic  activity  in the period  since the 
Second  World  War. The performance  of the CLI leaves  much room for 
improvement.  Indeed,  the conclusions  of a fair  number  of earlier  studies- 
some  cited  above-regarding  excessive  false  signaling  is heavily  underscored 
here.  I have  found,  on the basis  of a set of rules  that  permit  the CLI  to per- 
form  reasonably  well  at recognized  turning  points,  that  it exhibits  a 50 per- 
cent false-peak  rate.  Half of all the peak  predictions  given  out by the CLI 
turn  out to be false  signals.  I have  also found  that  a reasonable  calculation 
of ex ante lead  times  produces  a substantially  shorter  set of leads  than ap- 
pears  in the official  data  on the basis  of ex post  judgments. 
On the more  positive  side, an experiment  designed  to reveal  the differ- 
ences  in performance  of the historically  revised  CLI and the preliminary- 
first  revision  CLI established  virtually  none of any significance.  The test, 
by its nature,  was to some  extent  biased  against  showing  large  differences, 
but there  was still considerable  latitude  for differences  to emerge  and they 
simply  did not. If the CLI is used as a qualitative  predictor-that is, as a 
direction-of-change  predictor-then predictions  that employ the data as 
they  become  available  in published  sources  will  differ  little  from  the ex post 
predictions  resulting  from subsequently  revised  data. This is a powerful 
finding,  but its practical  significance  is diminished  by the poor quality  of 
the performance  of the historically  revised  CLI itself. 
The  technique  of spectral  analysis  was  employed  to shed  light  on the per- 
formance  characteristics  of the existing  CLI.  Two major  findings  emerged: 
a verification  of the fact  that  the averaging  process  in the CLI  construction 
is inadequate  in filtering  out noise  (hence  the high  false-signal  rate),  and a 
clear  indication  that  simple  contemporaneous  averaging  of the twelve  com- 
ponent  leading  indicators  fails to make  the most efficient  use of the avail- 
able signal  information. 
I have suggested  an alternative  calculation  using the lead-lag  behavior 
estimated  by cross-spectral  techniques  and resulting  in an indicator  that I 
termed  the spectral  leading  indicator.  In the construction  of the SLI,  I em- 
ployed the clues from the spectral  results  to highlight  the major  cyclical 
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As first  constructed,  the SLI proved  vastly  superior  to the CLI  with re- 
spect  to the presence  of false  signals,  but  was  somewhat  inferior  to the CLI 
with  respect  to lead  times  at the recognized  turning  points  in economic  ac- 
tivity.  An alternate  SLI was constructed  to exhibit  a longer  lead time, al- 
though  at the likely  cost of lesser  reliability.  The alternate  SLI did in fact 
exhibit  longer  lead  times  than  either  the SLI  itself  or the CLI. Its false-peak 
rate  proved  to be somewhat  better  than that of the CLI (39 percent  com- 
pared  with 50 percent  for the 1956-71  period,  and  49 percent  for the more 
inclusive  1948-71  period),  but was distinctly  inferior  to that of the SLI it- 
self. 
The  spectral  construction  of a leading  indicator  seems  to me to be a pro- 
cedure  worthy  of further  investigation.  While  my results  are  highly  sugges- 
tive, they do not prove  the procedure  beyond  all doubt.  But-and  this is 
critically  important-I have not given the technique  its fairest  possible 
chance.  After  all, my experiments  were  based  strictly  on the leading  indica- 
tor components  that other  researchers  have  judged  the most useful  for the 
construction  of the CLI.  The spectral  indicator,  I submit,  does outperform 
the  CLI  even  on its own  data  base;  but  it can  be expected  to do considerably 
better  if it is based  on data  more  appropriate  to its own purposes.  It must 
be possible,  by considering  other potential  leading series, to find some 
reliable  leading  indicators  for the twenty-month  cycle component;  none 
exists  among  the 1966  short  list. It is also likely  to be possible  to find  some 
indicators  to substitute  for the large  number  of two- to four-month  leads 
contained  in the SLI  as I was  forced  to construct  it. Such  a discovery  might 
well  permit  construction  of a spectral  indicator  that  combines  the  false-peak 
rate of the SLI and the lead-time  properties  of the alternate  SLI. 
It may also be that the specific  construction  technique  that I have sug- 
gested  fails  to make  the most efficient  use of the spectral  information.  This 
too calls for experimentation-and  perhaps  theory  as well. 
I conclude  with  two personal  judgments.  To seek  to construct  a reliable 
leading  indicator  would  be eminently  worthwhile.  And the field  is still  wide 
open. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Alan Greenspan:  Saul Hymans  has done an impressive  job in extracting 
about as much  information  as I think one can get from  what  I consider  a 
very  weak  data  base.  In fact,  his paper  almost  succeeded  in shaking  my be- 
lief in the ultimate  unusability  of a composite  leading  indicator.  But I do 
continue  to have some very serious  questions  about the basic underlying 
procedure  of such a composite  indicator  approach. 
I don't  think  anyone  questions  that  every  individual  item  that  serves  as a 
leading  indicator  has forecasting  value.  At issue  is whether  some  combina- 
tion of these  indicators,  through  a certain  synergism,  provides  more  infor- 
mation than the sum of what is available  merely  by examining  the in- 
dividual  elements. 
What has always  disturbed  me about this type of procedure  is its am- 
biguity  with  respect  to theory.  On the one hand  the process  appears  wholly 
empirical.  Analysts  throw  into a hopper  a huge  number  of measures  of the 
economy  and filter  out those that happen  to have a pattern  of leading  the 
reference  cycles of the composite  coincident  indicator  over the particular 
period  chosen. 
Yet clearly  all is not empirical,  since  a number  of things  are  left out. One 
-which  is, incidentally,  an excellent  indicator  of the stock  market-is the 
length  of women's  skirts.  If one were  simply  sifting  through  numbers,  he 
would  tend  to use that.  In fact, the particular  short  list of indicators  in the 
CLI exhibits  a heavy  emphasis  on investment  incentives  and actions. 
Five of the twelve  indicators  reflect  profits,  stock  prices,  or capital  goods. 
Hence,  one can argue  that at least  some  crude  cyclical  theory  is implicit  in 
the indicator  approach.  But unless  one has a formal,  theoretical  view  as to 
why the particular  indicators  that led in the past should  lead  in the future, 
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the use of any one set to forecast  future  turning  points is obviously  on 
shaky  conceptual  ground. 
What  underlying  theory  can  be inferred  from  the choice  of indicators  ap- 
pears  to be hidden  in some  sort of black  box. The  very  heterogeneity  of the 
short  list of twelve  indicators  makes  them  very  difficult  to deal with.  They 
are a mixture  of trendless  ratios,  such as the workweek  and price  per unit 
of labor cost, and geometric  trend  series,  such as corporate  profits.  The 
latter are a special  problem  when prices  are rising  rapidly,  as they have 
been in the most recent  period.  Either  the figures  should be deflated,  as 
Hymans  points out in a footnote, or at least logarithmic  first  differences 
should  be used.  I am not sure  that  the trend  adjustment  applied  to the total 
composite  leading  indicator  or the spectral  leading  indicator  appropriately 
compensates  for this problem,  especially  for the current  period, when 
prices  have  been  rising  so rapidly,  clearly  distorting  some series  relative  to 
others. 
While  multicollinearity  is obviously  desirable  in an indicator  approach, 
I do not think it is appropriate  to utilize  series  that contain overlapping 
information.  For example,  the series  on new orders  of durable  goods in- 
dustries  and contracts  for plant  and equipment  are both heavily  weighted 
with the same new orders  of manufacturers  of capital  goods equipment. 
Profits  after  tax adjusted  for trend  and  price  per  unit of labor  cost are  con- 
ceptually  close, and would  show a much  higher  correlation  were  the data 
more accurate. 
In evaluating  the  performance  of these  series,  I question  the use of discre- 
tionary  ad hoc adjustments  such as those Hymans  makes  for strikes.  At 
what  point does one stop?  If special  allowance  is made  for an auto strike 
or steel strike,  why not Phase  4 or Phase  11/2  or devaluation? 
Still on the question  of evaluating  performance,  Hymans  uses the cri- 
terion that a leading  indicator  must give an indication  before  the event. 
Yet since  even  close observers  rarely  know  as long as two months  after  the 
fact that the economy  has turned  down, anything  that would confirm  a 
peak just as it  occurred,  or shortly thereafter,  also would have some 
value. 
The most interesting  thing  in Hymans'  analysis  was  the reliability  of the 
series  on net business  formation  as an indicator.  Finding  an indicator  like 
this by spectral  analysis  is in itself a valuable  result. 
While  I must  admit  I am basically  skeptical  about  an aggregated  indica- 
tor approach,  I suspect  that if it is to be salvaged  as a useful  tool and one 378  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1973 
that does not suffer  from the problem  of false signals,  the approach  that 
Hymans  has taken  is the right  route. 
Julius  Shiskin:  Saul  Hymans'  paper  is a welcome  contribution  to this  field. 
As he said,  it has been  a long time  since  the last review  of the usefulness  of 
this indicator. 
My impression  is that  short-term  forecasters  do not use the leading  indi- 
cator  index,  or the indicators  themselves,  in a mechanical  way. For exam- 
ple, many  people  are asking  Alan Greenspan's  question:  What  is the rele- 
vance  of the leading  indicator  index  today in view of the fact that several 
of the component  series  are expressed  in terms  of highly  inflated  dollars? 
I think  that's  a healthy  attitude,  and I am very  glad to see it. 
I want to make  three  principal  comments  on this paper.  My first  com- 
ment is that I think Hymans'  standards  are too high. He is asking  more 
from the composite  leading  indicator  index  than any of its advocates  are 
asking. For example,  in 1950, Geoffrey  Moore wrote, "There  is some 
ground  for confidence  that objective  use of these  methods  will at least re- 
duce the usual  lag in recognizing  revivals  or recessions  that have  already 
begun."  In 1955,  he wrote,  "It  is important  to be clear  about  what  these  re- 
sults do not mean,  as well as what  they do mean.  They  do not mean  that 
one can get much advance  notice that a general  business  contraction  is 
beginning  or is coming to an end. They do help one to recognize  these 
events  at about  the time  they occur.  Even  then  there  is some  risk  of error."' 
In April 1972,  I wrote  in an article  for The Washington  Post, "The  diffi- 
culties  of forecasting  being  what  they are,  the wise forecaster  will take ad- 
vantage  of all the help he can get. He will take into account  the complex 
effects of monetary  and fiscal policy on the cyclical process, other im- 
portant economic policy actions such as wage and price controls, and 
unusual  developments  such  as big strikes  and  military  events.  He will  make 
judgmental  analyses  of GNP accounts  and use econometric  models  based 
on both Keynesian  and monetary  theories.  And he will take advantage  of 
contributions  of the leading  index  and  historical  knowledge  about  business 
cycle  behavior. 
1. Geoffrey H.  Moore, Statistical Indicators  of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions, 
Occasional Paper 31 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950), p .76; Moore, 
"Leading  and Confirming  Indicators  of General  Business  Changes,"  paper  delivered  at 
the Annual Midwest  Conference  on Business  Indicators,  1955,  and published  in Moore 
(ed.), Business  Cycle Itndicators  (Princeton  University  Press for the National Bureau  of 
Economic  Research,  1961), Vol. 1, p. 79. Saul H. Hymans  379 
". . . What then can emerge is an informed judgment on the part of the 
forecaster  on [where  the economy  has been, where  it most] likely is, and 
what  the rough  probabilities  are of its moving  in various  directions  and at 
approximately  what  speeds."2 
The essential  question  is whether  the analyst  can make  better  short-term 
forecasts  by including  the leading  indicators  and their  index  in his tool kit 
of data and forecasting  techniques.  It is clear  from my quotations  that I 
believe  he can. 
Second,  I would view the question  of false signals  of cyclical  turning 
points  differently  from the way Hymans  does. This issue was popularized 
by Paul  Samuelson,  who once  said,  "Stock  prices  have  accurately  predicted 
nine of the last five recessions."  In considering  such criticisms,  I believe 
the definitions  of the  National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  must  be mod- 
ernized to include slowdowns  or retardations  in economic growth, or 
growth  recessions  (I find either  of these terms  acceptable).  Further,  rapid 
inflation  must  be taken  into account  in addition  to recessions. 
I think it is most useful  to consider  growth  cycles  and NBER business 
cycles  as a family  of cyclical  episodes  ranging  from  the deep  depression  in 
1933  to the mild  slowdown  in 1967.  All of these  must  be taken  into account 
in setting  a chronology  of cycles,  and in determining  whether  leading  indi- 
cators  in fact lead. 
In this context,  what  differences  in economic  policy  are  appropriate  for a 
contraction  that  just misses  the recession  definition  compared  with  one that 
just meets  it? For illustrative  purposes,  assume  that an index  of aggregate 
economic  activity  of 70 is the demarcation  line between  "recession"  and 
"no recession."  A planned  slowdown  from  a level  of 110  (to cool inflation- 
ary pressures)  that was expected  to stop at 71, but actually  stopped  at 69, 
can hardly  be considered  a policy  planning  failure.  On the other  hand,  an 
unplanned  decline  in aggregate  economic  activity  from an index  of 100  to 
71 must be considered  a bad mark against  the economic  policy makers. 
Furthermore,  different  policies  are clearly  required  to combat  a mild de- 
cline  to an index  of 69, and to combat  a severe  decline,  say, to 30. That  is, 
from  the point  of view  of policy,  the differences  between  a slowdown  and a 
recession  may not be significant,  whereas  the differences  between  two "re- 
cessions"  can be very  serious. 
Following  this approach,  Ilse Mintz concluded  that if a business  cycle 
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recession  is defined  to include retardations  in growth, then the leading 
index  shows  a one-to-one  match  at every  "cyclical"  peak  and trough  since 
1946;3  it leads  at nearly  every  turning  point  and  does not lag at any; and it 
gives  no false  leading  signals.  Thus,  while  a decline  in the leading  index  has 
always  signaled  a weakening  of the economy,  these  signals  sometimes  have 
been followed  only by retardations  in growth. 
Third,  I do not find Hymans'  rules  for testing  the forecasting  powers  of 
the CLI useful.  He fails to take advantage  of major  efforts  to use various 
smoothing  devices  to improve  the forecasting  powers  of CLI-principally 
the technique  I have referred  to as monthly  cyclical  dominance,  MCD. If 
he used such  a smoothing  technique,  he would  get a much  different  score- 
card  from  the one he derives  with  his direct  use of seasonally  adjusted  data 
and the unrealistic  set of rules  that he applies  to testing  those data. 
These  rules  can  produce  results  that  are  quite  contrary  to common  sense. 
The four hypothetical  examples  in Figure 1 illustrate  how their appli- 
cation  can (a) label  a true  peak  as false  (panel  A), (b) label  a false  peak as 
3. Ilse Mintz, "Dating American  Growth Cycles," in Victor Zarnowitz  (ed.), The 
Business  Cycle Today,  Fiftieth Anniversary  Colloquium I (Columbia  University  Press 
for the National Bureau  of Economic Research, 1972), pp. 39-88. 
Figure  1.  Hypothetical Examples  of  Errors under Hymans'  Rules  for 
Detecting Cyclical Turning Points from the Composite Leading Indicator 
NC = no change; P = peak coming; T = trough coming 
A.  True Peak Labeled as False 
Monzth  t-9  t-8  t-7  t-6  t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-I  t 
Predictiont  ...  NC  P  P  NC  NC  NC  P  P  P 








Hymans'  rule: At t  -  7 a peak would be predicted,  but this prediction  would be can- 
celed at t -  5 and given again at t -  2. This process yields a false peak signal and a 
lead of 4 (assuming  the business  cycle peak occurs at t). B. False  Peak Labeled  as True 
Month  t-9  t-8  t-7  t-6  t-5  t-4  .t-3  t-2  t-I  t 
Prediction  ...  NC  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P 








Hymans' rule: Since two consecutive  rises do not follow t  -  7, the peak prediction 
made at t -7  will not  be revised. 
C. Successive  False  Peaks 
Month  t-9  t-8  t-7  t-6  t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-I  t 
Predictionz  ...  NC  P  P  NC  NC  P  P  NC  NC 




Hymans' rule: At t  -  7 a peak prediction  would be made. It would be canceled  at 
t-  5 only to be issued  again at t -  3. The result  is two false peak predictions  in a very 
short time. 
D. The  Missed  Peak 
Month  t-9  t-8  t-7  t-6  t-5  t-4  t-3  t-2  t-I  t  t+I 
Prediction  ...  NC  NC  NC  NC  NC  NC  ATC  NC  T  T 








Hymans'  rule: At no time would a peak be predicted  under  the Hymans rule since in 
no case are there two successive  downward  changes. 
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true  (panel  B), (c) reduce  the actual  lead time (panel  A), (d) generate  false 
peaks  (panel  C), and (e) completely  miss turning  points  (panel  D). 
Table  5 of Hymans'  paper  clearly  shows  that a lot of spurious  turning 
points  were  generated  by his reliance  on these  rules.  It contains  eighty-two 
predicted  and  seventy-six  realized  turning  points  over  a period  of two hun- 
dred  eighty-five  months-an average  of less than  four  months  between  any 
two successive  points.  During  the same  period  there  were  ten NBER turn- 
ing points  and perhaps  six growth  cycle  turning  points-a  total of sixteen, 
with an average  of nearly  eighteen  months between  any two successive 
points. Tables 16 and 18 indicate  that even the SLI and alternative  SLI 
have  averages  of a little  over  seven  and  four  months,  respectively.  It would 
appear  that Hymans'  system  is designed  to forecast  something  different 
from  the NBER turning  points,  even after  growth  cycle  turning  points  are 
added. 
Hymans  seems  to understand  this. In discussing  his spectral  analysis  ap- 
proach,  he writes,  "The  shorter  periodicities  in the range  of two to eight 
months  can  hardly  be interpreted  as components  of the business  cycles  that 
are the focus of this paper."  Yet his turning  point test appears  to be de- 
signed  to test cycles  of these shorter  periodicities. 
I have asked  John  Early,  a BLS staff  member  who has done some  work 
on spectral  analysis,  to comment  on some technical  aspects  of Hymans' 
SLI series. 
John  Early:  Hymans'  use of spectral  analysis  to construct  a spectral  lead- 
ing indicator  index (SLI) is both interesting  and useful. However,  the 
method  raises  some  questions  about  the stability  of the results.  With  under 
three  hundred  months  of data, there  are very  few repetitions  of cycles  as 
long as sixty months  in duration.  But, as the following  data show, more 
than  half of the weight  of the index  is carried  by components  with  less  than 
eight observed  cycles.  Thus,  the results  could be sharply  influenced  by the 
inclusion  of additional  data. 
Periodicity  (months)  Weight  Observations 
60  0.22  5 
40  0.33  7.5 
30  0.27  10 
24  0.18  12.5 
A second  problem  arises  in evaluating  the forecasting  performance  of the Saul H. Hymans  383 
SLI and the composite  leading  indicator.  The predictions  are examined 
within  the sample  period  used to construct  the series.  Thus the choice of 
weights  and leads are affected  by the very  cycles  that are being  predicted. 
It might be desirable  to examine  the forecasting  accuracy  using the best 
estimates  of the weights  and leads available  prior  to the specific  turning 
point  that  was  being  questioned.  The problem  of within-sample  bias  seems 
to be less severe  for the CLI since  it does not make  use of lags, which,  as 
already  mentioned,  may be quite  unstable,  and since  this use of lags is the 
primary  source  of improved  performance  by the SLI. 
General  Discussion 
Thomas  Sargent  noted  that the leading  indicators  approach  to forecast- 
ing imposes  restrictions  that contradict  the theory  of optimum  prediction. 
In particular,  neither  a variable  nor a function  of that variable  can be a 
leading  indicator  for itself.  Yet such  functions  have  been  shown  to be use- 
ful predictors.  Sargent  also offered  an example  of a simple  case of distrib- 
uted lag relationships  in which  a variable,  X, is exogenous  and should  be 
used to predict  another  variable,  Y, yet where  spectral  techniques  would 
show Y to be the leading  indicator.  He noted that when phase statistics 
vary  across  frequency,  as Hymans  reported,  it is a symptom  of the case in 
which  variables  are connected  by distributed  lags. He suggested  that no 
inference  about  whether  one series  should  be used  to help  predict  another 
can  be drawn  merely  from  inspecting  the phase  statistic  at a few  frequencies. 
Thomas  Juster  pursued  Shiskin's  concerns  about the number  of false 
signals  in the indicators  reported  by Hymans.  He agreed  that Hymans' 
filter  rules  were  inappropriate  and that the magnitude  of a change  in the 
indicators  should  be taken  into account  as well as their  direction.  If rules 
were  devised  that tied identification  of a change  in the phase  of a cycle  to 
the size of the movement  in the indicators,  changes  would  be called  for far 
less  frequently  than  Hymans  reports  and  the number  of false  signals  would 
be sharply  reduced. 
Hymans  replied  that while additional  filtering,  such as Juster  recom- 
mended,  would  remove  some false signals  from the record,  it would also 
cut down  the forecasting  lead  of the CLI.  He thought  that  the major  differ- 
ence between  the CLI and SLI was that the SLI had adequately  filtered 
the data  to start  with.  He agreed  with  Juster  that  experimenting  with  quan- 384  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
titative  rules  for interpreting  the indicators  would  be an interesting  follow- 
up to the present  work.  Hymans  also pointed  out that his Table  5 should 
not be read as predicting  a cyclical  turn on average  every five months. 
Rather,  the table shows the number  of months when good forecasting 
would have signaled peak predictions  relative to the number  when it 
would  have predicted  no change  in the cyclical  phase. 
Arthur  Okun  and Hymans  discussed  the problem  of a correct  prediction 
that  is later  reversed.  Okun  noted  that  in such  a case,  Hymans  was grading 
the correctness  of the first  signal  by what  was forecast  subsequently  rather 
than by what actually  happened.  Hymans  replied  that consistency  forced 
one  to reject  such  confusing  signals,  regardless  of whether  they  were  correct 
originally. 
Okun  and Shiskin  then discussed  identifying  and determining  the sever- 
ity of recessions.  Okun  suggested  that leading  indicators  should  ideally  be 
sensitive  enough  to distinguish  important  downturns  from  retardations  or 
pauses  like those in 1956  or 1967.  Shiskin  replied  that a good way of sort- 
ing the significant  cases  from  the others  would  be to ask  how policy  would 
be affected.  In that sense,  he argued  that there would be little difference 
between  the 1967  mini-recession  and the recessions  of 1961  and 1969-70. 
However,  Okun  noted that the unemployment  rate as an indicator  would 
show an important  difference  between 1967 and the other two periods, 
which  would  have had significant  implications  for policy. 
Charles  Holt called  attention  to a methodological  inconsistency  in using 
spectral  analysis,  which  assumes  a linear  dynamic  system,  to analyze  turn- 
ing point  characteristics  of the  economy,  which  are  thought  to be nonlinear 
dynamic  phenomena.  One can approximate  any nonlinear  system  with a 
linear  system,  but the application  of spectral  analysis  should  be made  with 
this inconsistency  in mind. He noted that Shiskin's  observation  that lead 
times  for indicators  are  apparently  different  at peaks  and at troughs  points 
up an example  of the nonlinearity  in the economy's  cyclical  behavior. 